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ABSTRACT
Arrow (1962) argued that since a monopoly restricts output relative to a competitive industry,
it would be less willing to pay a ﬁxed cost to adopt a new technology. Arrow’s idea has been
challenged and critiques have shown that under diﬀerent assumptions, increases in competition
lead to less innovation. We develop a new theory of why a monopolistic industry innovates less
than a competitive industry. The key is that ﬁrms often face major problems in integrating new
technologies. In some cases, upon adoption of technology, ﬁrms must temporarily reduce output.
We call such problems switchover disruptions.I f ﬁrms face switchover disruptions, then a cost of
adoption is the forgone rents on the sales of lost or delayed production, and these opportunity costs
are larger the higher the price on those lost units. In particular, with greater monopoly power,
the greater the forgone rents. This idea has signiﬁcant consequences since if we add switchover
disruptions to standard models, then the critiques of Arrow lose their force: competition again leads
to greater adoption. In addition, we show that our model helps explain the accumulating evidence
that competition leads to greater adoption (whereas the standard models cannot).
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System.1 Introduction
Arrow (1962) postulated that a monopolistic industry would be less innovative than a com-
petitive one. His idea was simple: Since a monopoly restricts output relative to a competitive
industry, it would be less willing to pay a ﬁxed cost to adopt a new technology (since there
would be fewer units over which to “amortize” the ﬁxed cost). In this paper, we present
an alternative theory explaining why a monopolist would be less innovative. We start from
the fact that ﬁrms often face major problems in integrating new technologies. In some
cases, upon adoption of technology, ﬁrms must temporarily produce substantially below pre-
adoption levels. We call such problems switchover disruptions. Our idea is also simple: If
ﬁrms face switchover disruptions, then a cost of adoption is the forgone rents on the sales
of those “lost” units, and these opportunity costs are larger the higher the price on those
lost units. In particular, higher monopoly power means higher opportunity costs, so less
incentive to innovate.
Arrow’s idea has been challenged on theoretical grounds. A number of critiques have
shown that under diﬀerent (and, ap r i o r i , as reasonable) assumptions, increases in compe-
tition lead to less innovation. Our idea advances the literature since we show that if we
add switchover disruptions to a standard (Arrow-type) model, then the critiques of Arrow
lose their force: competition again leads to greater adoption. In addition, we show that our
model helps explain the accumulating evidence that competition leads to greater adoption
(whereas the standard Arrow model cannot).
Perhaps the most fundamental critique of Arrow’s idea is that, as a matter of theory,
when an industry faces increased competition (say through unilateral tariﬀ reduction), its
output may very well fall, and the Arrow logic then implies less innovation (see, e.g., Demsetz
(1969) and Yi (1999)). Another famous critique is that of Gilbert and Newbery (1982). They
switch some of Arrow’s assumptions (about w h oc a n“ b i d ”o nn e wt e c h n o l o g y )a n ds h o wa
monopolist now has a greater incentive to adopt than an “outside” rival. Other critiques are
discussed below. When we add switchover disruptions to a standard (Arrow-type) model, we
show that increases in competition lead to increases in adoption even if output of the industry
(and individual ﬁrms) falls, and even if we use the Gilbert and Newbery formulation.
Our model also explains the evidence that competition spurs adoption and productivity
in a way the Arrow model cannot. In particular, many plant-level studies ﬁnd that plant-
TFP and adoption increase with competition even as plant-output falls signiﬁcantly.1 The
1Below we discuss studies of industries facing increased competition (e.g., Schmitz (2005) and Dunne,
1Arrow model cannot explain rising adoption and TFP in the face of falling output, and in fact
predicts the opposite. But our model provides an explanation. Since increased competition
leads to lower prices, the opportunity cost of switchover disruption is reduced. Not only is
the model consistent with the facts, but in the industry studies noted above it is clear that it
was the reduction in the opportunity costs associated with switchover disruptions that was
the mechanism by which adoption increased. All this evidence is discussed below.
When considering the incentive of a ﬁrm to adopt an innovation, Arrow, Gilbert and
Newbery, and others, have assumed that new technology can instantaneously and seamlessly
be introduced. Adoption does not work that way, and the assumption that it does is not
innocuous. Firms often face major problems in integrating new technologies. We will present
extensive evidence on such phenomena in the next section.
Following our discussion of switchover disruptions, we present our “baseline” model. The
baseline model serves to illustrate the Arrow force for adoption (which we’ll call the Arrow
Output Eﬀect) and the new force introduced with this paper, the Switchover Disruption
Eﬀect (again, lower prices mean lower opportunity costs of switchover disruptions). We
then introduce extensions to this basic model to address the major critiques of the Arrow
idea. These extensions will show that the critiques do eliminate the Arrow Output Eﬀect,
yet the Switchover Disruption Eﬀect remains, and increases in competition can increase
adoption.
In our model, there will be an incumbent ﬁrm that faces a group of rival ﬁrms. The
incumbent ﬁrm will initially have a cost advantage over its rivals, indexed by the parameter
τ. One interpretation is that the incumbent is a domestic ﬁrm and the rivals are foreign
ﬁrms. Foreign ﬁrms must incur an additional cost of τ per unit (above and beyond production
costs) to serve the local market, where τ could be a tariﬀ or a transportation cost. A new
technology will become available. If a ﬁrm adopts the technology, its costs may initially
increase (if there is switchover disruption), and it may initially lose sales. We will consider
how the incentives to adopt the technology vary as the market power or tariﬀ parameter τ
is changed.
This incumbent-versus-rivals structure is similar to the approach in Gilbert and Newbery
and Reinganum (1983). The incentive-to-innovate literature has expanded to consider a wide
range of oligopoly models. Recent papers that review this literature are Vives (forthcoming)
and Schmutzler (2007). But all this literature, as far as we know, has assumed that ﬁrms
Klimek, and Schmitz (2008)) and studies of trade liberalization (an early study is Tybout and Westbrook
(1995), and there has been an explosion of papers since, many discussed below).
2can instantaneously and seamlessly introduce new technologies.2 Switchover disruptions are
not considered.
There is an old saying, “If you have a good thing going, don’t rock the boat.” Here, a
ﬁrm with a lucrative monopoly may decide not to adopt a technology that, in the short-run,
disturbs its lucrative position. There is another old saying, “If you have nothing to lose,
swing for the fences.” There are recent papers that have attempted to capture this idea in
models where ﬁrm’s R&D investment is a choice of variance in outcomes (see, e.g., Anderson
and Cabral (2007)). The point is to show that ﬁrms that are far behind may decide to choose
high variance R&D programs. Again, switchover disruptions are not considered.
Having switchover disruptions in economic models is by no means new. There is a large
literature where switchover disruptions play an important role, for example, in Jovanovic and
Nyarko (1996), Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), Klenow (1998), Parente (1994) and Schivardi
and Schneider (2008). A major focus of these papers has been to see how switchover dis-
ruption inﬂuences investment. In that sense, they are close cousins to this paper. However,
they have not considered how switchover disruptions in adopting technology might change
the relationship between market power and the incentive to innovate.
2 Motivating Switchover Disruption
We use this section to motivate introducing switchover disruptions into the incentive-to-
innovate literature. In particular, this section provides evidence that when ﬁrms adopt new
technologies, they often experience an initial increase in costs (or decrease in productivity).
In fact, of course, some new technologies never succeed.
One note before we begin. If new technologies can yield higher costs than old ones, ﬁrms
would obviously run “pilot” projects to learn if new technologies were better or not. Firms
obviously do this. But as argued and seen below, for many technologies testing can only
reduce uncertainty a modest amount. Pilot projects can often test only one dimension of the
technology in isolation from others. To know if a technology works can only be learned by
turning on all the systems at once. And then the system must be run for substantial periods
of time before the productivity of the technology is learned. In this paper, we do not delve
2In some papers there is uncertainty regarding how long it may take to develop an innovation. Similarly,
there are models where there is uncertainty as to how much better an innovation will be. But once an
innovation is developed, it can be seamlessly adopted.
3into why technology has this feature but explore its consequences.3
Let us start by presenting evidence on switchover disruptions faced by three well-known
ﬁrms. We then turn to more formal studies, looking at switchover costs in manufacturing,
supply-chains, and in organizational innovation in general.
2.1 Switchover Costs in Speciﬁc Adoption Episodes
When discussing evidence, we think it’s productive to begin with concrete examples of
switchover disruptions. We will give three such cases, though a much larger list is easy
to compile. The speciﬁc episodes are not meant to be a “test” of our model (i.e., one should
n o tb ea s k i n gw h e t h e rt h eﬁrms have lots of, or little, market power), but simply evidence
that disruption is important. A more productive way to test the idea is to look at cases
where ﬁrms faced large changes in market power, and ask how this changed their adoption
decisions. (We will address this a bit below.)
Boeing. In building the 787 Dreamliner, Boeing chose a new technology, one that involved
its suppliers assembling more of the parts oﬀ-site than usual, and then shipping to Boeing
for ﬁnal assembly. Such a process had been pursued successfully in other manufacturing
industries. However, Boeing has faced major problems — switchover disruptions — in imple-
menting the technology. Suppliers have been slow to send assembled parts, spurring Boeing
to request suppliers to ship unassembled work to them. But “Boeing has ended up with
a pile of parts and wires, and lots of questions about how they all ﬁt together, not unlike
a frustrating Christmas morning at home.” With ever growing delays in promised delivery
dates, Boeing may lose substantial business to Airbus. It’s clear that it is taking Boeing a
substantial period of time to learn whether the new system is better than the old.4
General Motors. In the 1980s, after suﬀering large losses in market share to Japanese
producers, General Motors (GM) invested heavily in automation and robots in order to stem
losses in market share. But when factories reopened with their new automation systems,
there were major production problems. Robots often did not run. When they did, they
“often began dismembering each other, smashing cars, spraying paint everywhere and even
ﬁtting the wrong equipment.” GM found that “technologies that worked well in isolated pilot
projects [weren’t] easily coordinated in the real world of high-volume manufacturing.” Many
3A related issue is why a ﬁrm does not immediately switch back to its old technology if costs initially
increase with adoption. Again, it is not possible to do so in many (all?) cases as is also seen below.
4See coverage in the New York Times, January 16, 2008, “Boeing Is Expected to Disclose Further Delays,”
and January 17, 2008, “Supplier Woes Lead to New Delay of Boeing 787.”
4of the factories were able to produce only a small share of their rated capacity for months
and months.5
United Airlines. When a new Denver airport was built in the mid 1990s, United Airlines
and the city decided to install a highly automated baggage handling system. There were
major switchover disruptions. The system “immediately became known for its ability to
mangle and misplace a good portion of everything that wandered into its path.” A year after
opening, United sued the builder of the system claiming it “performed miserably.” For the
ﬁrst decade of operation, United used only a stripped down version of the system. Finally,
United decided to turn the system oﬀ in 2005.6
2.2 Switchover Costs in Manufacturing
U.S. Apparel Manufacturing. Dunlap and Weil (1996) studied the adoption of new technol-
ogy, modular production systems, in U.S. apparel manufacturing. Of the ﬁrms they studied
(accounting for about 30% of industry shipments), about 40% had adopted the technology at
some point. Of those that adopted, about 50% abandoned the technology. The overwhelming
reason given for dropping the innovation was that it lowered labor productivity.
Japanese Steel Manufacturing. Nakamura and Ohashi (2005) examine the experience
of Japanese steel manufacturers when they shifted from the open-hearth furnace (OHF) to
the basic oxygen furnace (BOF) in the 1950s and 1960s. They found that plants adopting
the new technology experienced signiﬁcant declines in productivity (TFP) at the time of
adoption. They estimated a 14% drop in productivity initially, and that it was three years
before the BOF-productivity approached the level of the old OHF-productivity.
U.S. Steel Manufacturing. Ichniowski and Shaw (1995) studied the adoption of new tech-
nology in U.S. steel ﬁnishing lines. They looked at the adoption of management innovations,
in particular, human resource management (HRM) innovations. They view “the adoption
of an innovative HRM system as an investment decision analogous to a decision to invest
in physical capital” (p. 20). We share this view. One of the costs of adoption that they
emphasized was the uncertainty in how the technology would perform after adoption. A
5For coverage see “When GM’s Robots Ran Amok,” The Economist, 8/10/91, Vol. 320, Issue 7719,
“Tricky Auto Makers Discover ‘Factory of the Future’ Is Headache Just Now,” Wall Street Journal, May 13,
1986, “Detroit Stumbles on Its Way to the Future,” BusinessWeek, June 16, 1986.
6United’s lease (in 2002) requires it to pay the city $60 million a year for the automated system (for 25
years). Hence, United must swallow this loss. However, United will reduce its operating costs by returning
to manual baggage handling, and expects to save $12 million a year on these costs. For coverage of this story,
see “United Abandons Denver Baggage System,” Associated Press, June 7, 2005, and “Denver Airport Saw
the Future. It Didn’t Work,” New York Times, August 27, 2005.
5large part of the uncertainty arose from the potential resistance to the new technology (by
line workers, union oﬃcials, and managers).7 W es h a r et h i sv i e wt h a to n ep o s s i b l es o u r c eo f
switchover disruption is resistance to innovation.
General Manufacturing. Some researchers have looked at the productivity experience
of manufacturing plants after they have undergone a major surge in investment. Using
these surges as proxies for adoption of technology, they have found that productivity has
initially fallen after adoption. Studies include Huggett and Ospina (2001) who looked at what
happened to trend productivity growth after adoption, and Sakellaris (2004) who looked at
the impact on levels of productivity.
2.3 Switchover Costs in Supply-Chain Management
Changes in supply-chain systems will almost certainly cause switchover disruptions. There
is no way of knowing if a system is better without trying it. Boeing is now in the process
of such learning. There is a thriving literature in operations research and management that
has studied the consequences of supply chain disruptions, brought on by glitches in moving
to new technology and other sources of disruption. The literature has found large losses in
productivity and share value as a result of glitches (see, e.g., Hendricks and Singhal (2003,
2005) and references therein).
2.4 Switchover Costs in Organizational Changes
Organizational changes will almost certainly cause switchover disruptions. A new organiza-
tional structure might be better or worse, but there is really no way of knowing without the
entire organization trying it. If it is worse, there is no way to switch back to the old orga-
nization overnight if at all. We will discuss a few areas in which ﬁrms attempt to improve
their organizations (and lower their production costs).
Work Rule Changes. A subset of organizational innovation involves ﬁrms changing work
rules of a union. Here it may be clear that a new set of work rules (e.g., more ﬂexible ones)
would lead to much lower costs. Yet introducing the changes might lead to a union strike
and a considerable period of downtime. Indeed there are many episodes where ﬁrms were
shut down for long periods before being able to change the work rules, a n di ns o m ei n s t a n c e s ,
7According to Ichniowski and Shaw, “Our interviews highlighted many cases where attempts to introduce
new [technology] were undermined by low levels of trust between labor and management” (p. 51).
6were not able to change them at all.
A Potpourri of Workplace Changes. To ﬁnish this section, we’ll simply list some ex-
amples of other switchover disruption discussed in the organization literature. Marketing
departments have faced disruptions introducing sales force automation technology (see, e.g.,
Speier and Venkatesh (2002)). Human resource departments have faced disruptions in intro-
ducing new workplace compensation schemes (see, e.g., Beer and Cannon (2004)). And, of
course, introducing new information technology systems often leads to signiﬁcant disruptions
(see, e.g., Ginzberg (1981)). Lastly, there are obviously switchover disruptions as CEOs are
changed.
3 Baseline Model
Consider a homogenous products industry in which production takes place over a unit time
interval t ∈ [0,1].T h e r ei so n eﬁrm, the incumbent, that initially has a cost advantage over
its rivals.L e t c◦ denote the initial marginal cost of the incumbent. The rival ﬁrms (assume
there are two or more of them) each have marginal cost equal to c◦ + τ,f o rτ ≥ 0.T h e
parameter τ governs the degree of market power that the incumbent has over the rivals, and
it will be the key element in our comparative statics analysis.
One interpretation of the τ parameter is that the incumbent is a domestic ﬁrm and the
rivals are foreign ﬁrms. All ﬁrms have the same production cost c◦, but the foreign ﬁrms
must incur an additional cost of τ per unit which could be a tariﬀ or a transportation cost.
We assume Bertrand competition,t h a ti s ,t h a tﬁrms compete in price.
3.1 New Technology
At time t =0 ,anew technology becomes available. If the new technology is adopted at time
t =0 , then marginal cost at time t equals ct = f(t). We assume marginal cost falls over
time in a continuous and strictly decreasing fashion, f0(t) < 0.L e t ¯ c = f(0) be the high
initial cost and c = f(1) be the low cost ultimately attained, c < ¯ c.
We assume that c <c ◦ so that ultimately the new technology is better than the original.
The key innovation in our analysis is to allow for the possibility that ¯ c>c ◦.W h e n t h a t
happens we say there is a switchover disruption at the initial point of adoption. Figure 1
illustrates an example. We can think of there being some prior period t ∈ [−1,0) over which
7cost was constant at c◦. When the new technology is adopted, marginal cost goes up initially,
but eventually is lower.
3.2 Demand Structure
The quantity demanded (at each t ∈ [0,1]) in the industry at price p is QD(p).W e a s s u m e
that demand is weakly inelastic,t h a ti s
Rev(p)=Q
D(p)p is weakly increasing in p.( 1 )
This assumption simpliﬁes our calculations, because it implies that the incumbent will limit
price at the rival’s cost.
3.3 Who Can Adopt?
The ﬁnal issue to be determined is: Who gets to adopt the new technology? Our baseline
approach follows Arrow (1962). Here the incumbent alone has a choice to adopt. The
incumbent can pay a ﬁxed cost F ≥ 0 to adopt the new technology or pay no ﬁxed cost and
use the original technology instead. If the incumbent does adopt, the rivals can be excluded
and the rivals’ ﬁxed cost remains at c◦ + τ. The essence of the Arrow setup is that the
incumbent is choosing between having the new technology for itself and no one having it.8
4 Monopoly and the Incentive to Innovate
This section provides our baseline analysis of how the incentive to innovate depends upon
the monopoly power parameter τ. The analysis highlights two forces for how a decrease in τ
increases incentives to innovate. The ﬁrst is the familiar Arrow Output Eﬀect. The second
is the new eﬀect, the Switchover Disruption Eﬀect, that we introduce with this paper.
In this baseline model, recall that only the incumbent has the option to adopt. Consider
the incumbent’s decision at t =0(if it does not adopt at t =0 , it would never adopt). If the
incumbent does not innovate, the equilibrium price from Bertrand competition is the limit
price p◦ = c◦ +τ. This yields a proﬁtm a r g i no fp◦ −c◦ = τ per unit sold. The incumbent’s
8In many cases, this setup is clearly appropriate. When a ﬁrm decides whether to adopt a new supply
system, a new human resource system, and so on, it is the only ﬁrm that has a say.
8sales will be Q◦ = QD(c◦+τ) at each instant along the unit time interval and the proﬁt ﬂow
τQD(c◦ + τ).
In calculating the present value of proﬁts, it will be convenient in the analysis to integrate
over the cost path c(t) rather than over t. For the case where f is continuous and strictly
decreasing, let G(c) denote how much time remains when marginal cost equals c,f o rc ∈ [c,¯ c].
That is, G(c) is the value of x solving f(1 − x)=c.T h u s G(¯ c)=1and G(c)=0 ,a n d
0 <G (c) < 1 for c <c<¯ c. The c.d.f. over marginal cost during the time interval is 1−G(·)
and let g(c)=−G0(c) be the density of marginal cost. Finally, letting ρ be the discount
rate, deﬁne h(c) as
h(c) ≡ e
−ρ(1−G(c))g(c).( 2 )
This will show up in the formulas below as the weight on proﬁts when cost is c.T h e ﬁrst
term takes into account discounting, since the time is t =1− G(c) when cost is c.T h e
second term takes into account the density of c.9








If the incumbent adopts, it obtains a cost path that starts with ¯ c and monotonically decreases
to c. If the initial cost ¯ c is above c◦ + τ, it drops out of the market until its cost falls to the
limit price. Beyond this point, the incumbent’s cost c is below c◦ + τ, and it sets the limit
price p = c◦ +τ.10 The present value to the incumbent from adoption, netting out the ﬁxed
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− F.( 5 )
9As a help to the reader regarding notation, consider the case if there was no discounting. Then since h(c)
is the “weight” at each c, the integral of h(c) over costs equals one, that is,
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10If the initial cost ¯ c is below c◦ + τ, the incumbent sets the limit price over the entire interval.




















The slope is the sum of two terms. The ﬁrst is the Arrow Output Eﬀect. The second is
the Switchover Disruption Eﬀect. We next state Proposition 1 which provides suﬃcient
conditions under which falls in the tariﬀ increase innovation.
Proposition 1. At any τ where the return to adoption is positive, W(τ) > 0,t h es l o p e
is weakly negative, W0(τ) ≤ 0, and is strictly negative if either (i) D0(c◦ + τ) < 0 (strict
downward sloping demand) or (ii) ¯ c>c ◦ + τ (signiﬁcant switchover disruption).









> 0.( 7 )
T h i ss a y st h a t ,o na v e r a g e ,p r o ﬁtability per sale increases. Plugging (7) into the slope formula
(6) immediately implies W0(τ) ≤ 0 and the claims about the strict inequality follow as well.
Proposition 1 says that if the new technology is worth adopting (W(τ) > 0), then an
increase in τ decreases the return to adoption (W0(τ) < 0).11 This implies that the return
to adoption takes the form of a cutoﬀ rule ˆ τ where the incumbent adopts if τ<ˆ τ and does
not adopt if τ>ˆ τ.( L e t ˆ τ =0in cases where it never adopts and ˆ τ = ∞ in cases where
it always adopts.) If we think of F as a random variable with some distribution, then the
cutoﬀ ˆ τ will decrease in F. Hence adoption is more likely the lower is τ.
To get a clearer picture of the ﬁrst term of dW
dτ in (6), the Arrow Output Eﬀect, it is







◦ − c]dc,i f¯ c ≤ c
◦ + τ.
It equals the average (marginal) cost reduction from the new technology times the change in
11We note that we can extend Proposition 1 to the case of elastic demand for the special case where the
cost path takes on two values, f(t)=¯ c for t<ˆ t and f(t)= c.
10market quantity from higher market power. The big idea is that there exist scale economies
from adoption. There is one ﬁxed cost and cost savings per unit are applied to multiple
production units. The greater the market power through τ, the lower the production
volume, and the fewer units over which to average the expense of the ﬁxed cost. In short,
an incumbent with high market power does not sell many units and so is less inclined to pay
ag i v e nﬁxed cost to lower marginal coat. This well-known idea from Arrow is also called
the replacement eﬀect (see, e.g., Tirole (1988) on this terminology).
To get a clearer picture of the second term of dW
dτ in (6), it is helpful to rewrite this term
when ¯ c>c ◦ + τ. I nt h i sc a s et h et e r mr e d u c e st o





◦ + τ (8)
This equals (minus) the present-value-weighted total time of the switchover disruption period
times the volume of lost sales. If the monopoly power index τ increases by one dollar, this
is the additional proﬁt forgone during the switchover disruption.
This eﬀect can be seen in Figure 2. For this ﬁgure, we assume that demand in perfectly
inelastic. In the ﬁgure, there are two identical panels, except that the switchover disruption
in the left hand panel is “small” (that is, c◦ +τ>¯ c) and is “large” in the right hand panel.
The dark shaded area in both panels represents the total proﬁts that are lost as a result
of the disruption, and the light shaded area are the proﬁts that are gained when costs fall
below original costs. In the left hand panel, when an incumbent adopts, it does not lose any
sales, and the Switchover Disruption terms drops to zero. Increases in τ in this case do not
increase the size of the dark shaded area and have no eﬀect on adoption decisions. In the
right hand panel, when an incumbent adopts it loses sales. Now, increases in τ increase the
size of the dark shaded area. The opportunity cost of the forgone sales during the disruption
period is greater, decreasing the incentive to innovate. This is the term (8).
5 First Extension: Declining Output
Arrow’s view that competition leads to greater innovation has been challenged on theoretical
grounds. Perhaps the most fundamental critique is that, as a matter of theory, when an
industry faces increased competition (say through unilateral tariﬀ reduction), its output
may very well fall, and the Arrow logic then implies less innovation. In this section we show
11that if the baseline model above is extended to allow for decreasing output, then competition
still leads to increased innovation (under some conditions, of course).
To begin addressing this issue, consider what happens if demand QD(p) is perfectly
inelastic so that dQD/dp =0 . The Arrow output term in the slope (6) reduces to zero. If
there is no signiﬁcant switchover disruption (¯ c ≤ c◦ + τ), the second term is zero as well, so
ac h a n g ei nm a r k e tp o w e rτ has no impact on the incentive to innovate. However, if there
is signiﬁcant switchover disruption, ¯ c>c ◦ +τ, the second term is strictly negative, and our
result that the incentives to innovate decline with τ goes through.12
A decrease in the monopoly index τ might decrease the incumbent’s output. For example,
suppose the industry here is an intermediate good industry in the manufacturing sector.
Suppose it sells its output to other domestic manufacturing ﬁrms. Now imagine that there
is a unilateral tariﬀ reduction across all manufacturing industries. The tariﬀ reduction will
lead to a price reduction in the intermediate good industry, but some of its local market may
simply disappear. Some of its upstream industries (or ﬁr m s )m a yb ee l i m i n a t e db yi m p o r t s .
Then, even as the intermediate industry’s price falls, industry output falls. This was the case
in the U.S. iron ore industry in the 1980s. Foreign competition led the domestic industry to
signiﬁcantly reduce its price, yet the sales of the industry also fell signiﬁcantly (since U.S.
steel producers lost sales to foreign steel producers).
We could extend the baseline model along the lines suggested in the paragraph above
(distinguishing intermediate manufactures, etc.) But to keep things simple, we’ll assume a
reduced form relationship between industry demand and the tariﬀ rate, that is, we’ll assume
demand is QD(p,τ).H o l d i n gp ﬁxed, quantity demanded falls in τ. Again, one interpretation
is that τ is a manufacturing-wide tariﬀ, and its reduction means a smaller market for this
intermediate industry.
In terms of the analysis above, in equation (5), we replace QD(c◦+τ) with QD(c◦+τ,τ).
To look at the impact of an increase in τ on the incentive to innovate, we need only replace
dQD/dp in ﬁr s tt e r mo ft h es l o p e( 6 )w i t hdQD/dτ, where of course this latter derivative
is a “total derivative.” If the total derivative dQD/dτ < 0, everything is qualitatively the
same. But if dQD/dτ > 0, then the sign of the ﬁrst term in (6) (the Arrow Output eﬀect)
ﬂips. In particular, if there is no signiﬁcant switchover disruption so that ¯ c ≤ c◦ + τ,t h e
incentive to innovate W(τ) strictly increases with the market power parameter τ, as opposed
to decreasing. This is the “declining-output” critique. However, if there is signiﬁcant
switchover disruption, there are two oﬀsetting eﬀects. If the output eﬀect from dQD/dτ is
12The reader will notice that this situation was covered by Proposition 1.
12not too big, the Switchover Disruption eﬀect will dominate, and an increase in τ will decrease
incentives to innovate.
Notice that switchover disruptions are needed to explain how increased competition can
lead to increased innovation in the face of output declines. This is a feature of empirical
studies, that is, increased adoption in the face of falling output, that has remained a puzzle
until now.
The evidence comes primarily from two sources, studies of speciﬁc industries that have
undergone a dramatic increase in competition, and from unilateral trade liberalizations.
The industry studies, and trade liberalization studies, uniformly show that as competition
increases, productivity (e.g., TFP) at the establishment level increases.13
What happened to the size of the industry and individual establishments as competi-
tion increased (and spurred productivity)? Here, too, the studies speak with one voice:
competition reduced industry and establishment size.
Consider ﬁrst the study of speciﬁc industries. When competition hit the U.S. iron ore
industry, its output fell in half. It was only after more than a decade that industry output
returned to a level close to its pre-competition level. The same was true at the establishment
(i.e., mine) level (Schmitz (2005)). In cement, foreign competition reduced industry output
by 30 percent in the early 1980s and output did not reach its pre-competition level until the
mid 1990s. In U.S. transportation, rail competition greatly reduced water shipments.
In the studies of (unilateral) trade liberalization’s impact on productivity mentioned
above, not all studies looked at the consequences of liberalization on industry (and estab-
lishment) size. But among those that did, establishment size falls. Hay (2001) shows that
following unilateral trade liberalization in Brazil, its large manufacturing ﬁrms lost signiﬁcant
market share to foreign ﬁrms, had their proﬁts fall sharply, yet increased their eﬃciency dra-
matically. Treﬂer (2004) ﬁnds that reductions in Canadian tariﬀs against the United States
led to reductions in gross output per plant in Canada.14 Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen
(2008) show that (European) plants facing the greatest increase in imports from China had
the greatest increase in technology adoption (and had the greatest reduction in size measured
13Studies looking at speciﬁc industries, in addition to those discussed below, include Bridgman, Gomes
and Teixiera (2008). Studies of trade liberalization’s impact on plant productivity have grown signiﬁcantly
in the last decade. The studies, which uniformly ﬁnd a positive impact on plant productivity, include
Amiti and Konings (2007) (Indonesia), Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) (U.S.), Bloom, Draca, and Van
Reenen (2008) (OECD), De Loecker (2007), Hay (2001) (Brazil), Fernandes (2007) (Columbia), Muendler
(2004) (Brazil), Pavcnik (2002) (Chile), Topalova (2004) (India), Treﬂer (2004) (Canada), and Tybout and
Westbrook (1995) (Mexico).
14Treﬂer’s Table 5 shows the negative impact of tariﬀ reductions on size.
13by employment).15
It is hard to understand these ﬁndings in Arrow-type models, the ﬁndings that as a
plant shrinks from foreign competition its TFP (and technology adoption) increases. Our
theory here provides an interpretation of these ﬁndings. As competition lowered price in
these industries, it reduced the opportunity costs of lost sales if adopters ran into switchover
disruptions. Not only is the argument consistent with the facts, but in the industry studies
noted above it’s clear this was the mechanism by which adoption increased.
Consider for example the U.S. iron ore industry. For nearly a century, until the early
1980s, the U.S. and Canadian iron ore industries were the exclusive suppliers to steel plants
in the Midwest manufacturing belt (e.g., Chicago and Cleveland). At that time they faced
as i g n i ﬁcant increase in competition in these markets. In response, they adopted a technol-
ogy that led to a surge in productivity. The technology was a change in organization, in
particular, a change in work rules (see, for example, Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz (2002)
and Schmitz (2005)). The ﬁrms could have instituted these changes prior to the reduction
in market power, but there would have been a switchover disruption, namely, a likely pro-
tracted strike by the union. With signiﬁcant market power, and high iron ore prices, the
opportunity costs of lost sales were too high. With the surge in competition, prices and rents
fell dramatically. The opportunity costs of a protracted strike were now much lower, and the
ﬁrms decided to pursue new work rules.16 Similar developments occurred in the U.S. cement
industry (Dunne, Klimek and Schmitz (2008)) and U.S. transportation industries (Holmes
and Schmitz (2001)).17
To close this section, let’s return to another theoretical critique of the Arrow model, one
that is related to the declining-output issue: What happens if the new technology reduces
ﬁxed costs, leaving marginal cost alone? Suppose there is a ﬂow ﬁxed cost φ that must be
paid each instant when output is positive, but not paid at zero output. Suppose initially, the
cost is φ
◦, but if the new technology is adopted the ﬁxed cost goes from ¯ φ at the beginning to
φ< ¯ φ in the end. If ¯ φ is high enough, the incumbent will shut down initially to avoid paying
15There is another literature that looks at the impact of trade liberalization on average ﬁrm and plant
size (but does not focus on productivity). An important paper in this literature is Head and Ries (1999).
Summarizing this literature, Tybout (2006) says, “The ﬁnding that foreign competition is associated with
smaller ﬁrms in import competing industries seems robust.”
16It’s also quite possible that the ﬁrms thought the possibility of a strike, and its duration if it did happen,
had fallen as well. But our model predicts this, too, is a force for technology adoption.
17The studies above looked at how changes in competition led to changes in technology adoption. Other
studies have looked cross-sectionally, for example, Syverson (2004). Other proxies for changes in competition
include regulatory restructuring (e.g., see Fabrizio, Rose and Wolfram (2007)) and changes in cartel laws
(see, e.g., Symeonidis (2008)).
14it. It is straightforward to see how we could redo the analysis of the previous section with
this setup. The Arrow Output eﬀect would of course disappear because it depends upon
production volume which is irrelevant with a ﬁxed cost. However, the Switchover Disruption
term remains, and competition again leads to adoption (if the switchover costs are large
enough).
6 The Second Extension: Gilbert and Newbery
A famous critique of Arrow is Gilbert and Newbery’s (1982). They change the model setup
and allow the rivals to also bid for the new technology. They show the monopolist has the
greatest willingness to pay and that it increases in τ. In this section we show that if the
baseline model above is extended to allow for the rivals to bid, then competition still leads
to increased innovation (under some conditions, of course).
Formally, we assume an outside researcher can sell exclusive rights to use the technology
to the incumbent or one of the rivals. If a rival uses the new technology, it still needs to
pay the friction τ, in addition to the marginal production cost. Assume that the outside
researcher can commit to an auction technology that extracts the full surplus from the bidder
with the highest willingness to pay. In the analysis, we need to determine: Who has the
highest willingness to pay, the incumbent or a rival, and how much is the high bidder willing
to pay? We examine how the answers to these questions depend upon τ.
We proceed by ﬁrst working things out when there is no switchover disruption. We
then determine how things change when we put switchover disruption into the model. To
highlight the role of switchover disruption, we zero out the Arrow Output eﬀect by assuming
demand is perfectly inelastic at unit demand, i.e., QD(p)=1for all p.
We begin with some additional notation. As in the previous section, let v denote the
present value to the incumbent when it acquires the new technology. Now let u denote the
present value to the incumbent when a rival obtains the new technology. Finally, let r be
the present value to a rival when it acquires the new technology.
6.1 Adoption with no switchover disruption
Suppose there is no switchover disruption, ¯ c ≤ c◦.D e ﬁne value vNo_SD to be the value to
the incumbent of acquiring the rights to the new technology. This is just the formula (4) in
the previous subsection with QD(c◦ + τ)=1and min{¯ c,c◦ + τ} =¯ c.T h e v a l u e uNo_SD to





h(c)[c + τ − c
◦]dc.( 9 )
By using the max operator in (9) above, we subsume diﬀerent cases. If max{¯ c,c◦ − τ} =
c◦ − τ (equivalently c◦ ≥ ¯ c + τ), the incumbent is immediately undercut at the point of
adoption by a rival and the integral above is 0 (limits of integration are c◦ − τ and c◦ − τ).
If alternatively c◦ < ¯ c + τ, the incumbent is at least initially the low cost producer, taking
into account the friction τ, but it will have to set the price to c + τ to match the adopting
rival.






◦ − τ − c]dc,
where, again, by using the min operator above we subsume diﬀerent cases.
The maximum willingness to pay for the rights to the new innovation is
W
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max{c◦−τ,c} h(c)[c + τ − c◦]dc,
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The ﬁrst term in the maximization is the willingness to pay by the incumbent, the diﬀerence
in return between having the production rights and a rival having them. The second term
is the return to a rival owning the rights (a rival without rights gets proﬁt equal to zero.)







◦ − c]dc,w h e nτ =0 ,
the present value of the cost reduction. This expression follows from the fact that, with no
switchover disruption, max{¯ c,c◦ − τ} =m a x{c◦ − τ,c} = c◦ (when τ =0 ), and min{¯ c,c◦ − τ} =
¯ c and min{c,c ◦ − τ} = c. Next observe that the willingness to pay rNo_SD of the rival strictly
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◦],
and ﬁnally Z max{¯ c,c◦−τ}
max{c◦−τ,c}
h(c)dc.
The ﬁrst two terms are zero (in each term, either the derivatives are zero, or if not, the rest




















This last derivative is strictly positive if τ<c ◦ −c and zero for τ ≥ c◦ −c. Hence for τ>0,
the willingness to pay by the incumbent strictly exceeds that of the rival, and the willingness
strictly increases in τ up to the threshold. In summary, we have proved:
Proposition 2. Assume the Gilbert and Newbery setup applies, that demand is perfectly
inelastic, and that there is no switchover disruption (¯ c ≤ c◦).
(i) If τ>0, the incumbent has a higher willingness to pay for the new innovation and so
will outbid the rival so WNo_SD =vNo_SD − uNo_SD.
(ii) WNo_SD(τ) strictly increases in τ for τ<c ◦ − c and is constant above this point.
Part (i) of the proposition is a variant of Gilbert and Newbery’s famous result that
innovation is worth more to the incumbent than to a new entrant and so the incumbent will
preemptively patent before a rival. The incumbent will take into account that if it does not
17preemptively innovate and the entrant adopts instead, the incumbent will lose its monopoly
rent. In contrast, the rivals have no rent to forgo if they don’t innovate.
Part (ii) of the result is really an elaboration on part (i). The larger is τ the larger is the
incentive of the incumbent to hold onto its monopoly rents and so the more the incumbent is
willing pay for the innovation. This remains true until τ>c ◦−c. When the friction is bigger
than this threshold, a rival cannot displace the incumbent even when its costs have fallen to
c. So the incumbent will enjoy the full value of the friction τ whether or not the incumbent
or a rival have the new technology, meaning changes in τ don’t impact willingness to pay.
Part (ii) of Proposition ﬂips the Arrow result because if there is a given underlying cost F
to create the innovation, the higher is the monopoly index τ, the more likely it is that the
underlying willingness to pay exceeds the innovation’s cost.
6.2 Adoption with switchover disruption
The intuition embodied in Proposition 2 for how monopoly can raise the incentive to pay for
innovation is well understood. The key point we want to make here is that this result depends
heavily on the assumption that there are no switchover disruptions. We will show that the
presence of switchover disruptions can overturn the results in Proposition 2. Note that in
introducing switchover disruption, we must now allow the possibility that the incumbent
m i g h tb u yt h et e c h n o l o g ya n dl e a v ei ti d l e . ( W i t hn os w i t c h o v e rd i s r u p t i o n ,¯ c ≤ c◦,t h e
incumbent would always use the new technology it it owned the rights.)











Here Hdisrupt is the (weighted) duration of the switchover disruption, where the weight de-
pends upon the cost density and the discount factor, and Hbeyond is the (weighted) duration
“beyond the disruption,” when cost is lower than its initial value c◦.
We start by determining what happens when the degree of market power τ is small.
Proposition 3. Assume the Gilbert and Newbery setup applies, that demand is perfectly
inelastic, and that there is a period of switchover disruption (¯ c>c ◦). Suppose that τ is
small.
18(i) If Hdisrupt <H beyond, then the incumbent obtains the innovation and WSD strictly in-
creases in τ.
(ii) If Hdisrupt ∈ (Hbeyond,2Hbeyond), then the incumbent still obtains the innovation, but
WSD strictly decreases in τ.
(iii) If Hdisrupt > 2Hbeyond, then a rival obtains the innovation and WSD strictly decreases in
τ.
Proof. Suppose ¯ c>c ◦ and τ ∈ (0,c ◦−c). To do the analysis, we need to derive four diﬀerent
returns.
First Return: vSD






◦ + τ − c]dc (10)
where if min{c◦ + τ,¯ c} =¯ c, the incumbent is always the low cost producer.
Second Return: iSD
This is the return if the incumbent acquires the rights to the new technology but leaves
it idle. Hence no rival adopts. We ignored this possibility in the non-disruption case because






since the markup is τ, and demand is unity.
Third Return: uSD
This is the return to the incumbent of not acquiring the technology (so that it ends up








h(c)[c + τ − c
◦]dc.( 1 1 )
The ﬁrst term is the return over the disruption interval, that is, the time before the adopting
rival’s cost (not including the friction τ) has fallen to c◦, that is, the interval [c◦,c].T h e
adopting rival begins with total cost c + τ (which satisﬁes c + τ>c ◦ + τ>c ◦), but since
there are other rivals (we assumed multiple rivals) with cost c◦ + τ, the incumbent’s limit
price is c◦+τ,a n di t sm a r k u pτ. The second term is the return after the disruption interval.
19In this period, the adopting rival has a cost c +τ<c ◦ +τ.F o rt h eﬁr s tp a r to ft h i sp e r i o d ,
the incumbent’s cost c◦ remains lower than c+τ, during which period the equilibrium price
is c + τ. Eventually, since c <c ◦ and since τ<c ◦ − c by assumption (since τ is assumed
“small”), a point is reached (i.e., c + τ = c◦) where the rival that adopts is the lowest cost
producer (including the friction τ) and the incumbent’s proﬁti sz e r of r o mt h a tp o i n to n .
Fourth Return: rSD






◦ − τ − c]dc,
since its limit price is c◦,a n di t sm a r g i n a lc o s ti sc + τ.
Willingness to pay in the switchover disruption case is given by
W
SD









We begin by noting that for τ close to zero, it is immediate that vSD >i SD,s ow ec a n
ignore the idling possibility for the rest of this proof. So we compare vSD − uSD and rSD.
Note at τ =0they are equal. Let us diﬀerentiate the diﬀerence, vSD −uSD, with respect to
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and note that, at τ =0 , drSD/dτ = −Hbeyond.
If Hbeyond >H disrupt,t h e nf o rτ =0 , (12) is positive and greater than (13). This implies
that the incumbent has the highest willingness to pay for small τ.T h u sWSD
GN = vSD −uSD,
20and this is strictly increasing for small τ, proving (i).
If Hdisrupt ∈ (Hbeyond,2Hbeyond), then (12) is strictly negative but still greater than (13).
Thus WSD = vSD − uSD and is strictly decreasing for small τ,p r o v i n g( i i ) .
If Hdisrupt > 2Hbeyond, then (12) is strictly less than (13). So a rival has the highest
willingness to pay. So WSD = rSD which is strictly decreasing, proving (iii). Q.E.D.
The above is a local result, holding around τ =0 . The next result (Proposition 4)
generalizes the two ways that big switchover costs overturn Gilbert and Newbery (which are
parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3) to a wider range of τ. Before stating Proposition 4, we
need to deal with the complication that for certain parameters, it may be the case that the
incumbent obtains the rights to the innovation but then leaves it idle. The following lemma
shows that if this ever happens for any τ, it happens for all higher τ.
Lemma 1. Fix all the parameters of the model except for τ.I ft h e r ee x i s t sa n yτ where the
incumbent obtains the new innovation rights but then idles it (and has a strict preference to
do so), there is a ˆ τ>0 such that for all τ<ˆ τ, the incumbent does not obtain and idle the
new innovation but if τ>ˆ τ the incumbent does obtain the rights and idles it.
Proof. See appendix.
Deﬁne ˆ τ = ∞ in the event that there is no idling for any τ. Proposition 4 requires an
additional assumption.
Assumption 1: Assume that f0(t)eρt increases in t.
A few remarks about assumption 1. We earlier assumed that f0(t) < 0.N o w i f t h e
discount rate were ρ =0 , this assumption would be simply be that f00 > 0, i.e. that f is
convex such as in the example in ﬁgure 1. This would be a standard assumption in any
kind of learning over time setup where the initial advances come in at a faster rate than
later advances. If ρ>0,w en e e dm o r et h a nc o n v e x i t ys i n c et h eeρt term works against the
assumption (note f0(t) < 0).W en e e df to be convex enough. For example, if f(t)=ke−γt,
then we need γ>ρfor the assumption to hold. Assumption 1 directly implies that h(c)
decreases in c.18
With this setup, we can now generalize the two ways that big switchover costs overturn
Gilbert and Newbery (which are parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3) to a wider range of τ.
Proposition 4. As in Proposition 3, assume the Gilbert and Newbery setup applies, that
demand is perfectly inelastic and that there is a period of switchover disturbance (¯ c>c ◦).
Assume further that Assumption 1 holds.
18Recall that h(c) ≡ e−ρ(1−G(c))g(c) =- e−ρtf(t)−1,f o rt solving c = f(t).
21(i) If Hdisrupt >H beyond, WSD strictly decreases in τ for τ<min{c◦ − c,ˆ τ}.
(ii) If Hdisrupt > 2Hbeyond, a rival obtains the innovation for all τ<min{c◦ − c,ˆ τ}.
Proof.F o r τ<min{c◦ − c,ˆ τ}, by the deﬁnition of ˆ τ, the incumbent is not idling the





◦ + τ) − h(c
◦ − τ),i fc
◦ + τ<¯ c,
= −h(c
◦ − τ),i fc
◦ + τ>¯ c
Assumption 1 implies h0 < 0, so the above is strictly negative. Since Hdisrupt >H beyond,
vSD−uSD is strictly decreasing for small τ. Since the function is strictly concave, it is then
strictly decreasing for all τ ∈ (0,c ◦−c).N e x t n o t e f r o m ( 1 3 ) t h a t rSD is strictly decreasing.
Now WSD ≡ max
©
vSD − uSD,rSDª
where vSD−uSD and rSD are both decreasing functions
of τ. The maximum of decreasing functions is a decreasing function, proving (i). Next observe
from diﬀerentiating (13) with respect to τ that rSD is (weakly) convex. If Hdisrupt > 2Hbeyond,
the slope of rSD at τ =0is strictly greater than the slope of vSD−uSD.S i n c erSD is convex
and vSD − uSD is concave and since vSD − uSD = rSD at τ =0 , rSD >v SD − uSD for
τ ∈ (0,min{c◦ − c,ˆ τ}) as claimed. Q.E.D.
The intuition of the results for the Gilbert and Newbery structure can be gleaned from
a simple example. Ignore discounting by setting ρ =0 . Suppose that during the disruption
p e r i o d ,m a r g i n a lc o s ti si n ﬁnite, that is, c = ∞,s ot h a tn op r o d u c t i o nc a nt a k ep l a c e .O n c e
the disruption period is over, then marginal cost is c < (c◦ − τ). If the incumbent adopts




◦ + τ − c).
I ft h ei n c u m b e n td o e s n ’ ta d o p ts ot h a tt h er i v a lg e t si t ,i tm a k e sap r o ﬁto n l ya sl o n ga st h e











◦ + τ − c) − H
disruptτ.( 1 4 )
22W ec a ne a s i l ys e eh e r et h a ti ft h eHdisrupt period is longer than the Hbeyond period, an
increase in τ will lower the incumbent’s willingness to pay for the innovation. Obviously, the
disruption period has to be quite big here, half of the entire period. But note that if we add
discounting, the disruption period need not be so long for the result to go through since the
disruption is bourne up front. So adding discounting magniﬁes the eﬀect.19
7 The Third Extension: Learning by Doing
The previous two sections considered critiques of Arrow’s logic that competition increased
adoption. In this section we consider whether our logic about switchover disruption’s impact
on adoption holds under diﬀerent assumptions about how costs fall after adoption.
In the baseline model, if a ﬁrm adopts, then the path of its costs depends only on time.
In particular, its costs do not depend on output, as they would if there was learning-by-
doing (LBD). Since costs only depend on time, if the incumbent adopts and there is a large
switchover disruption, that is, ¯ c>c ◦ + τ,t h e ni ti salways best for the incumbent to drop
out of the market until ¯ c = c◦ + τ. So, the incumbent always loses sales.
If there is LBD, then a ﬁrm’s production rate inﬂuences its costs. In this case, perhaps
the ﬁrm will choose to produce when ¯ c>c ◦ +τ. If it produces, there is a current loss (since
marginal cost exceeds price), but costs also come down faster. So, if there is LBD, perhaps
an incumbent does not choose to reduce sales after adoption. If it did not reduce sales, then
the eﬀect we have introduced disappears.
In this section, we address this issue with a simple version of our model with learning by
doing. We show that under general conditions our eﬀect does not disappear.
Suppose for simplicity that demand is perfectly inelastic at QD =1and that there is no
discounting. Suppose there are two cost levels after adoption, ¯ c>c ,a n dt h a tc o s tr e m a i n sa t
the high level ¯ c until the ﬁrm attains a critical knowledge K∗. In general, knowledge comes
from both raw time and production experience. Speciﬁcally, conditioned upon adopting





α]dt,( 1 5 )
19Note that there are other forces that act like discounting that will also magnify the impact of switchover
disruptions. One example is if there is a small probability each “period” that the market disappears (for
example, because of the development of a substitute product).
23where q(t) is the incumbent’s production at time t.A s s u m e α ∈ (0,1). Speciﬁcation (15)
nests the pure time model that we formulated in Section 3. To see this, if β =0and λ>0,




the critical level of knowledge is obtained and cost drops from ¯ c to c. This is the pure time
model.
For the rest of this section, to stack things against us, we assume that time has no impact
on learning, that is, λ =0 . We also assume that ¯ c>c ◦+τ. So if the incumbent does adopt,
if it ever wants to lower costs to c, it will have to initially produce at a loss. We normalize
β =1in (15). Finally, we assume
K
∗ < 1,
so that if the incumbent does produce the unit demand through the time interval, it obtains
the required knowledge level before t =1 .
Suppose that the ﬁrm adopts and attains the critical knowledge at time ˆ t. Assuming the
curvature parameter α<1, and given no discounting, it is immediate that the ﬁrm should
be smoothing production at a constant q solving
K
∗ = ˆ tq
α.
(Where again we have normalized β =1 .) Alternatively, if the ﬁrm chooses a constant
production rate q,i ta c h i e v e sK∗ by ˆ t(q),w h e r e






a n dt h eb o u n da to n ec o v e r st h ec a s ew h e r ea c c u m u l a t e dk n o w l e d g ei si n s u ﬃcient by t =1 .
The incumbent chooses a learning-period production level ¯ q to solve
v =m a x
¯ q≤1
−ˆ t(¯ q)¯ q(¯ c − c
◦ − τ)+
¡
1 − ˆ t(¯ q)
¢
(c
◦ + τ − c).( 1 6 )
During the learning period, the incumbent sells ¯ q ≤ 1 units at a loss (¯ c − c◦ − τ),a n dt h e
balance of the unit market demand is met by the rivals. After the low cost c is attained, the
incumbent takes the entire unit demand and begins to enjoy proﬁt c◦ + τ − c.
24Our next result shows that if learning is “concave enough” (α<. 703 is suﬃcient), then
there exists a range of ¯ c under which it is optimal for the incumbent to set an output level
¯ q during the learning phase that is positive but strictly less than one, i.e., it only partially
meets the market demand during this phase. To set up the result, we need to introduce two


















For a ﬁxed K∗ < 1,d e ﬁne ˆ α by M1(ˆ α) ≡ M2(ˆ α)/K∗. I nt h ea p p e n d i xw h e r ew ep r o v e
Proposition 5, we show there is a unique ˆ α ∈ (.703,1) satisfying this condition. Our result
is:
Proposition 5. Fix α<ˆ α and deﬁne cutoﬀs ¯ c1 and ¯ c2 by
¯ c1 − c◦ − τ




¯ c2 − c◦ − τ







The cutoﬀss a t i s f y¯ c2 > ¯ c1 and ¯ c1 >c ◦ + τ. In the solution to problem (16), if ¯ c ∈ (¯ c1,¯ c2),




c◦ + τ − c
¯ c − c◦ − τ
< 1.( 1 9 )
If instead ¯ c<¯ c1,t h e n¯ q =1during the learning period. If ¯ c>¯ c2,t h e ni ft h eﬁrm were to
adopt, ¯ q =0for all t and knowledge K∗ is never attained.
Proof. See appendix.
As before, deﬁne W(τ)=v(τ) − v◦(τ) − F to be the net value of adopting the new
technology. Our result is
Proposition 6. Assume α<ˆ α.I f ¯ c<¯ c1,t h e nW0(τ)=0 .I f ¯ c>¯ c1,t h e nW0(τ) < 0.











ˆ t(¯ q)¯ q +
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1 − ˆ t(¯ q)
¢¤
− 1.
The bracketed term is the slope of v obtained from (16) using the envelope theorem. The
impact of a change in τ is simply the average output. If ¯ c>¯ c1, then from Proposition 5,
¯ q<1, and average output under adoption is strictly less than one, implying W0(τ) < 0.I f
¯ c<¯ c1, average output under adoption is one, and W0(τ)=0 . Q.E.D.
Proposition 6 shows that our basic insight continues to hold if we cast the disruption
period as learning by doing. If ¯ c is large enough so that losses during the learning period
are big enough, an incumbent that is adopting will contract its sales below the full market
level of one unit. The bigger is τ,t h em o r ec o s t l yt h e s el o s ts a l e s ,a n dt h el e s st h er e t u r n
to adoption.20
8 More Extensions
In this section, we brieﬂy discuss some straightforward extensions of the model. These
extensions show how the model can be interpreted more broadly, and how the eﬀects we talk
about can be magniﬁed.
8.1 Incumbent faces rivals in many markets (i.e., variation in τ)
In the analysis above where there is a large switchover disruption, the incumbent loses its
entire market for a period of time. But in more general models, the incumbent need not lose
i t se n t i r em a r k e ti no r d e rf o rt h ee ﬀect we are talking about to go through.21 We illustrate
20One important thing to note is that in the extreme case where α =1so there are no diminishing returns
to learning, the incumbent goes to the corner upon adopting and either sets ¯ q =1or ¯ q =0 . Now it will
never choose to adopt and set ¯ q =0 . So if the turn to adoption is positive, then the return does not vary
with τ, because the incumbent does not lose sales if it adopts. It is crucial for our result that there be
diminishing returns in learning, so that the incumbent smooths out its learning and loses some sales. Another
thing worth noting is even though an incumbent with higher τ is less likely to adopt, given that it does adopt
we can see from (19)) that it will operate at a higher output ¯ q during the learning period and hence attain
the required knowledge K∗ faster.
21Another extension (besides the one we consider below) would be for the incumbent, upon adoption, to
be able to produce only a certain fraction y of its pre-adoption output for a period of time. We could assume
during this period it produced at marginal cost c (or c), and that once the period is over, it produced at c.
26this here by allowing the incumbent’s advantage over rivals to be big in some markets, and
small in others. In this setup, even during the switchover disruption when the incumbent has
high costs it will nonetheless continue to sell to consumers over whom it has high monopoly
power. The incumbent will lose mobile consumers during the disruption and on account of
these mobile consumers our results will go through.
So now assume that there are multiple markets that diﬀer by τ,i np a r t i c u l a r ,l e tτ ∈ [0,¯ τ].
To keep things simple, assume demand is perfectly inelastic in each market and that the level
of demand in each market diﬀers by a scaler weight a(τ). Furthermore, assume that ﬁrms
can perfectly discriminate between the markets, being able to oﬀer a distinct price p(τ)
to each market τ.T h i s s i m p l i ﬁes things considerably, as we can determine the Bertrand
Equilibrium in each market separately.
This structure can be given several interpretations. In terms of the tariﬀ example
m e n t i o n e de a r l i e r ,i tm a ys i m p l yb et h ec a s et h a td i ﬀerent consumers face diﬀerent tariﬀs.
Or we can interpret this as heterogeneity in transport costs in a spatial context with a
Hotelling-like structure. We can put the incumbent in the center of a country. Buyers
located in the center of the country have high τ because in addition to paying any tariﬀ they
have to incur transportation costs to ship imports inland. Buyers located on the coast have
lower τ.
Let Wmany-markets be the net return to innovation in this new many-markets model. Given
that the equilibrium can be determined in each τ market separately, we can use equation (5)
of Section 3 to determine the return to innovation W(τ) in each τ m a r k e ta n dt h e ni n t e g r a t e





Since we have assumed perfectly inelastic demand here, the ﬁrst term in the slope of W(τ)
in equation (6) (the Arrow Output eﬀect) is zero. It is immediate then that W0 (τ) ≤ 0 and
that the inequality is strict for those τ markets where ¯ c>c ◦+ τ, i.e. where the incumbent
is initially out of the market just after adoption. It is then clear that an upward shift
in the distribution of τ (in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance) strictly decreases
willingness to pay and our result goes through. We also see that in the very high τ markets
(where ¯ c<c ◦+ τ), the incumbent retains its sales just after adoption, so the incumbent’s
aggregate output never goes all the way to zero.
278.2 Consumer Dynamics
Our consumer model features no dynamics. Fixing the prices of the incumbent and all
rivals, quantity sold by the incumbent is independent of history. There is a large literature
that emphasizes the importance of dynamics on the consumer side. Consumers may bear
“switching costs” when they shift from one provider to a second provider. If the consumer
goes ahead and makes such a switch, the ﬁrst provider might have a diﬃcult time getting
the consumer back. See Klemperer (1995) for a survey of this literature.
If we introduce these kinds of dynamics on the consumer side, the eﬀe c t sw ea r ei s o l a t i n g
here are magniﬁe d . W em a k eo u rp o i n tw i t has t y l i z e de x a m p l eb u to u rp o i n ti sm o r e
general. Suppose that when consumers purchase from a rival, there is some probability they
never will come back to the incumbent. Speciﬁcally, demand available to the incumbent
decays at rate δ when demand is met by a rival ﬁr m . I nt h i sc a s ew ec a nr e w r i t et h e







◦ + τ − c) − H
disruptτ.
This is the same as (14), except the ﬁrst term now includes a decay factor for consumers
lost over the course of the disruption interval (which has length Hdisrupt). In the original







For any positive disruption interval Hdisrupt, the above condition will hold for large enough
consumer decay δ.
8.3 Uncertainty
The model is set up with a deterministic cost structure. Often there is a great deal of
uncertainty in the adoption of a new technology and this reinforces our point. It may be
that a new technology is worse than the existing one, even in the long run, but the only way
to ﬁnd out is to try it. Moreover, once a ﬁrm tries it, it may be stuck with it, at least for a
substantial period of time. For example, the adoption of a new baggage handling system in
the Denver airport turned out to be a mistake, but it took ten years before they abandoned
it.
28We can capture this with a simple relabeling. Suppose that the model is a static one, in
which there is uncertainty about the realization c of a new technology. Assume that if the
cost draw ends up c>c ◦, the adopting ﬁrm is stuck with it–that is, the cost of reverting to
the previous technology is prohibitively high. If we simply let h(c) be the density of the cost
draw c for the new technology, the model is formally identical to the model studied, and all
of our results go through.
9C o n c l u s i o n
Overall, while the Arrow theory provides a possible explanation of why monopolies are
observed to be sluggish innovators, it does not seem to ﬁt the evidence particularly well.
Indeed, monopolists tend to be conservative in a great many ways. And indeed, this makes
sense: if you have a good thing going you do not want to rock the boat. The one thing a
m o n o p o l i s tf e a r sm o s ti st h el o s so fm o n o p o l y .T h i si se x a c t l yt h ed r i v i n gf o r c et h a te x p l a i n s
why switchover disruptions can be so important: a competitor has little to fear from a
disruption as they are earning little to begin with. A ﬁrm with a lucrative monopoly is well
advised not to jeopardize it by adopting a technology that may in the short-run at least,
threaten its lucrative position.
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Note that at τ =0 ,iSD−uSD =0 ,w h i l evSD−uSD = rSD > 0.N e x tn o t ef o rτ ∈ (0,c−c◦),
that iSD−uSD is strictly increasing while rSD is strictly decreasing. For τ>c −c◦, iSD−uSD
is weakly increasing, while rSD is ﬂat. Hence if there is ever a point τ where iSD−uSD >r SD,
there is a unique cutoﬀ τ0 where iSD−uSD = rSD,a n diSD−uSD <r SD if and only if τ<τ 0.
If c◦+τ<¯ c, then the slope of iSD−uSD is strictly greater than the slope of vSD−uSD and
otherwise the slope is equal. Hence if there is ever a point τ where iSD−uSD >v SD−uSD,
there is a unique cutoﬀ τ00 where iSD−uSD = vSD−uSD,a n diSD−uSD <v SD−uSD if and
only if τ<τ 00.
If the points τ0 and τ00 don’t exist, then for no τ is there a strict preference to idle. If











Figure 1: Appendix Figure 1
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
We begin by plotting the functions M1(α) and M2(α) in Appendix Figure 1. It is
immediate that M1(α) ≤ 1 for α ∈ (0, 1
2],t h a tM1(α) > 1, M0
1(α) > 0 for α ∈ [1
2,1),a n d
that limα→1 M1(α)=∞. It is immediate that M2(α) > 1 for α ∈ [1
2,1).I n t h e ﬁgure it is
readily apparent that M0
2(α) < 0,f o rα>1
2 and limα→1 M(α)=1 . Note that the M1 and
M2 f u n c t i o n si n t e r s e c ta tap o i n ts l i g h t l ya b o v eα = .703. Given these facts, it follows that




so that for α<ˆ α, M1(α) < 1
K∗M2(α).G i v e n t h e d e ﬁnitions (18) of the cutoﬀs ¯ c1 and ¯ c2,i t
follows that ¯ c2 > ¯ c1 and ¯ c1 >c ◦ + τ.
Recall from the text that






and the incumbent chooses a learning-period production level q to solve
v =m a x
q≤1
−ˆ t(q)q(¯ c − c
◦ − τ)+
¡
1 − ˆ t(q)
¢
(c
◦ + τ − c).( 2 1 )
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31This formula applies when q is in the interval q ∈ [K∗,1].F o r q<K ∗,t h eﬁrm never learns




c◦ + τ − c
¯ c − c◦ − τ
.
It is straightforward to prove that for q ∈ [K∗,1], ˜ v0(q) ≥ 0 implies ˜ v00(q) < 0. Hence, if
˜ q(¯ c) ∈ [K∗,1], ˜ q(¯ c) must be the unique maximizer of ˜ v(q) for q in the interval [K∗,1].
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where we use the deﬁnitions of ¯ c2 and M1(α) and M1(α) and that M1(α) < 1
K∗M2(α),f o r







Since α<ˆ α, M1 >M 2.S i n c e α<1 and since K∗ < 1, it follows that ˜ q(¯ c2) >K ∗. Hence
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˜ v(˜ q)
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c◦ + τ − c
¯ c − c◦ − τ
¶−α
=0 ,a t¯ c =¯ c2.
T h el a s tl i n ef o l l o w sf r o mt h ed e ﬁnition of ¯ c2. At this point it is convenient to write ˜ v(q,¯ c)
as an explicit function of ¯ c.W eh a v es h o w nt h a ta t¯ c =¯ c2, ˜ v(˜ q(¯ c2),¯ c2)=0 .S i n c e ˜ v(q,¯ c)
strictly decreases in ¯ c,f o rq>0, it is immediate that ˜ v(˜ q(¯ c),¯ c) < 0,f o r¯ c>¯ c2. Hence the
optimal policy (given adoption) for ¯ c>¯ c2 is to set ¯ q =0and sustain no losses during the
learning period and never learn. For ¯ c<¯ c2, it is immediate that the optimal policy is to
set ¯ q(¯ c)=m i n{˜ q(¯ c),1}.N o w˜ q(¯ c) monotonocially decreases in ¯ c.B y t h e d e ﬁnition of ¯ c1,
˜ q(¯ c1)=1 .S o f o r ¯ c ∈ (¯ c1,¯ c2), 0 < ¯ q(¯ c) < 1 as claimed. Q.E.D.
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(b) Large Switchover Disruption